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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

-------------.

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

:
:

Case No.
11260

.

ANTHONY MONTOYA,
Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

--------------

Appeal from the judgment of the Third

Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding.
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Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Assistant Attorney Genera
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Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

ANTHONY MONTOYA
In Pro Se
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Draper, Utah
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IN 'l'JJE SUPJU<:I'1E COUT<'l' OF 'THE
S'I'/\~L'E

OF UTJ\H

S'rl\'TE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff·--Respondent,

Case No.
11260

vs.
AN'THONY MONTOYA I

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STA'l'EMENT OF Nl\TURE OF CASE

The appellant, Anthony Montoya, appeals froru a conviction of robbery.
DISPOS I'l'ION IN

THE LOl1iTER COURrr

The appellant was charged with and
co11victed by a jury of robbery.

The Honor-

a}J) r:' R:cya11 L H. Croft imposed the statutory

-1

rH]ei crn1inatc sentence of not less than

five years and vd1jcb may be for life.
RELIEF SOUGil'l' ON l\PPEAL

Hesponc1ent seeks af f irmancc of the
judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
STArrEMENT OF FACTS
Late in the evening of January 30,
1967, three men entered a tavern at 706
South State Street in Salt Lake City.
While one of the men stood at the door
holding a gun on the owner, the two others
approached the ovmer and one of them struck
him, then ordered him to lie on the floor.
'l'he other Oi->ened the cash register and re-

moved $135.00.

The three then fled

(R.45-

:>J) '

Subsequently, the tavern owner identiLi ec1 dppcLlant from a photograph,

and later

}lid~('<1
Cd

Lj

<1ppclL1.11t out i11 a

n(.J i.. hdt lie'

Vht:C;

linc-·up, indi-

one: of the men who had

rol_,])ed him tlncc dciys earlier

(R.73).

Appellant was represented at trial by
a competent attorney who had been a member

of the bdr for seven years, and who had
extensive experience in the trial of criminal cases.

Three witnesses, as well as

the appellant himself,

testified in appel-

lant's behalf that he had been at home at
the time of the robbery.

However, the jury,

in its discretion, chose not to believe the
alibi defense and returned a verdict of
siuilty.

POIN'.I' I
APPELLJ\H'J' WAS NO'l D8N1ED THE EFFECTIVE
1

ASS IS'l'l\NCE C>l'
f>l:FEW3 l: •

coun:;:r~L

IN

THt~

CONDUCT OF HIS

4

1'hc fundzuu('nt<:11 privilege of an acto the effective Llssistancc of coun-·

cu~_;e:·cl

scl in the conduct of his defense is well
established in our system of law.

Powell

( 1 9 3 2 ) ; S t ate v •

v .:.. j\ -l<?:.~ >~irJl:1:.1

2 8 7 U• S • 4 5

F0.Ell§~lQ!.'.:th,

13 Utah 2d 103,

368 P. 2d 914

This court has recognized that

(1962).

the right to effective representation entitles an accused to r8presentation by a
reputable member of the bar who is in a
position honestly and conscientiously to
r~prcsent

~2.!_th_,

his interests, State v. Farns-

s~1pra,

and who "shows a willingness

to idcnljfy himself with the inte.cests of
the defendant and present such defenses
as arc available to him

undc~

the law and

conEdstent with the ethics of the; profes-

s.ion.
No.

11

['.J~.,!~_y_.! ___'l~~I1-~_r,

ll?.07

(.Jan.

3,

1969).

Sup. Ct. Ut ab,

n L \).; s

scr tcc1 l he i ncornpc t cncc of

d<' f (

i iud

h_i

tr ia.l counsc 1

~:;

c.1 ~:3

cffL'

leq ion, and from these

cases the follov1in9 principles emerge:

In

order for the dcf cnse of an accused to be
deemed constitutionally inadequate, an extrcme case must be disclosed, Maye v. Pres~'

162 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1947), so that

counsel's lack of diligence or competence
amounted to no representation at all, People
~Ie~_E._en~,

4 Ill. 2d 131, 122 N .E. 2d 231

(1955), and reduced the trial to a farce or
a sham.

Cross v. U.S., 392 F.2d 360 (8th

Cir. 1968); Cardarella v. U.S., 375 F.2d

Ca1.2d '160, 386 P.2d 487 (1963); People v.

The burden of establishing ineffective
trial representation is
f~nu~nt,

aJw~ys

upon the de-

for duly appointed members of the

l1zir

d.r c

tlw

(lc:[e11sc

p-1~c~-;umcc1

y__._J1?-1-=1::~?Jl~'\',

Wo_ 1 t z,

:in

a

be

to

criminu_l cusc.

427 Pa. 599,

J.n_()_~1eguac_y_____2-:f

Michel v.

235 A.2d 349

(1967)

'J'_f'_ia 1 DC? fens e R epr es en-

59 N.W.L.Rev. 289,

.1-~-Lt_ion_,

to act for

cornpctcnt

303

(1965).

Ac-

cordingly, courts have been reluctant to
second-guess the considereci actions of appcirently gu0lified lawyers, Note,
L. Rev. 1434

(1965),

78 Harv.

and mere improvident

strategy, bad tactics, mistaken carelessness
or inexperience do not necessarily amount
lo ineffective representation.
y~,$__ ._,

256 F.2d 707

~Ji_n_t._0,

(D.C.Cir. 1958), cert.

358 U.S. 857

d~il.~_-9_S}_,

331 F.2d 552

(1958); Tompa v. Vir-·

(4th Cir. 1964)

1434,

ltl-43

(1965).

Note,
The

·1'r1 Ila; v.

L.

sLa11darc1

to be applied when counsel's ade-

CJUcJCY

IL.:.:c>

Hev.

Edwards v.

been called into question was

7

CiJ cui t

to

Court of l\ppcals said that the right

effoctiv~

counscJ. means:

. not errorless counsel, and
not counsel judged ineffective by
hindsight, but counsel reasonably
likPly to render and rendering_
reasonably effective assistance.
3 81 F • 2 d 61 9 , G2 5 (5th Cir . 19 6 7) •
Smo_JJ1erman .:::z_. _Beto_,

276 F .Supp. 579

(N.D. Tex. 19G7) states the rule as follows:
When the adequacy of a defense rendered by an attorney is subjected
to attack the relevant consideration is not whether the case was
lost where it could have been won,
but whether counsel stood still and
did nothing .
. to the extent that
his representation failed to render
f'_§_~s o_Q_a b J_ y__e f_ f.~SLUY e ass is tan c e to
the accused.
276 F.Supp. at 586.
This court has similarly judged the
effectiveness of defense counsel accordin9 to a rule of reason.
~~2r:lJJc,
u_

13 Utah 2d 103,

rcpulcibJ0 attorney,

In State v. Farns-

3G8 P.2d 914 (1962),
during the conduct of

[;

l,r. ,3

J

11]

ancl a

failcc1

rur:>11t,

Jlny;

he

lttc1C:k

Lo 0bjccl tu

of ccrt21j n evidence,

no opC:'ning state-·

~he

introduction

and crosf;-·examincd but

one-' of the prosecu-1 ion

In af-

witne~~ses.

firrnjng the subsequent convictjon,

the court

quite properly observed:
The record inclicates no <let ion or
inaction by the tri21l attorney
which could not !'_~~[;jQr:ia J ly_ f i_nd
~~pl~~~-~)-oQ_Jll__-2_JE~.Slit imu tQ _exer_c i~.§__o f _3_:t_r~~~ t=_:qy_.
• 3 68 P. 2d
at 91S .
(Ernpha sis aoded.)
Employing the same analysis,

this court

sj 1;1iJ ar ly dee] a.1:ed defense representation
to he cffcct:ivc in Stu_~l::~'!-·__ ___1=i_~_gl:?_etter,
Uld1 2r1 :-354,
j2_~nnt_s_,

!Jl? P.2d 31/

14 Utah 2d 404,

(1966)

17

and State v.

38S P. 2d 152

Let us turn to the case at bar.

(1963)

The

c.:ppeJ J ctnt h0s set forth gener<il and conclu~:ciry

~-i ·, I I ; . '

' ,

~1l]€''jccl J_C•ilS

t

-I ~

>1.J

.- -

O:C

•

fr1 E:'Cl_J_\'C
~
•

J_l1E'_

quoting tlic

S; I 11 !?

fr Cl I ii

tr j al repre(' 0) (' S

V •

~)

e.xlrr- itlc' example of jncffcc-Livc u.ssistance

of c0u11::_·.cl.
however,

Th0sc borrowed allegations,

simply do not fit thc-c instant case.

In order to show that he has been deprived

of the effective assistance of counsel,
appellant must "descend to particulars,"
setting forth specific acts or omissions
on the part of defense counsel which would
substantiate the charge of ineffective representation.

Gilpjn v. U.S., 252 F.2d 685

(6Lh Cir. 1958).

Here, neither the record

nor appellant's brief suggest any basis for
the swccpjng allegations of failure properly
to prepare for trial,

failure to advise

appellant of his rights, failure to elicit
riktL-Lers of defense, and failure to conduct
approprjate factual and legal investigations.
'I'o the contrai_y, the record discloses a

J ()

,

L

1 ,

r lIJ

Iy

l ,1- c p r-i 1

wiL nr·ssc::.; uncl
pro:::; ccu t

e c1 c1 e f c n ::__~ e o f

dc[~c:.iJJd

a 1i b i

sup --

cro~;s-exu.rnination

of

ion \.'it ne s se s.

l\ppi:c:l12.nt

l1ds

maoe only two specific

clurgcs relatin9 to the adequdcy of his defense which are worthy of inquiry.

He first

contends that the failure of counsel to object to evidence of the robbery victim's
identification of appellant from a line-up
amounted to ineffective representation.

In

support of this charge, appellant alleges
facts relating to this generdl appearance of
otlie::i:

p2c.:011!'.;

in the same line-up.

The

2i1lc9cc1 d.: .c:.r,irniJc:i.rity of appellant and the
other persons in the line-up is not supported
b:/ f.:,cL.c
C(it1l

cnt

1-,, }_k'

o.f record, c:i.nd thus appellant's

ic)n~;

in this regard are not properly

cc1:.·;id1:c::r-cd by tl1is courl,

for on appeal,

LI

appc1 L1nt

i~;

bound by the tried record and

lns claim must be CXL't11plifj ed within its
four
295

con1c~rs.

(196~>).

\'Jt:1:u 2,

59 N.W.L.Hev.

289,

However, assuming these factual

allegations to be true, it is clear that
counsel's failure to elicit such matters
prior to or during the trial, even if not
a legitimate exercise of strategy, was not

prejudicial to appellant.

The record is

clear that the victim identified appellant
prior to the line-up in question (Tr.31).
This prior independent identification thus
renders harmless any alleged error in failure of counsel to object to the line-up,
and it is clear that the use of harmless
error ruJcs is constitutionally permissible
in adequacy of counsel cases.
L.

Rev. 1434, 1435

Note, 78 Harv.

(1965).

Appellant's second contention, that his

1.-lc,fcn·;c cou1Y:cl

tc• objccl to
'
Vl_C

t im
• I s

\Jd~;

hcar~;zrl1

'
'
t
G'LdlE[llCll''c:

ineffective fen

failure

evidence rcg<:irding the:>
to a

•
po J lCC

is s irnilar ly v.ri thou l~ mc:>r it.

officer,

It is well

recognized that trial strategy often dietates that objections to hearsay evidence
be withheld for a number of reasons.

'I'he

objection may unduly annoy the jury to the
defendant's prejudice, or the witness' demeanor may be such that allowing him to
testify will permit the jury to detect inconsistencies which injure the witness'
credibility.

In the instant case, counsel

might well have concluded that the hearsay
evj_c1cnce

to the
tJc,

tjur1

hannless, so that an objection

tc~;timony

l:llH1

cl_i_cnt.

\--Jd:Cj

would accomplish very lit-

at tlw risk of prejuc1icing his
Indeed, thP evidence here' in gues-

tuE:1-rlv
_,

r0'iterated the e0clicr testimony

13

oJ tlJ1

vi<:lirn,

anc1 th11s

coun~:::e:l'

s

failure

io object cannot lie c1cu11ed prejudicial to
J1

is

thcJ~cforc

apparent

that counsel's decision not to object to
this evidence was clearly within the bounds
of lcgitim:::i_te strategy and in no way may

be said to amount to ineffective representation.
J:>OIN'I' II
THE CIRCU1'1STJ',NCES SURROUNDING APPEL-

LANT'· S IDENTIFICZ\'I'JON BY THE VICTIM DID NOT
AMOUN'J' TO A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

Appe1lant's second point on appeal sets
forth several

~lJegations

relating generally

to ttie victim's identifjcation of appellant
as

011'2

of the men who committed the robbery.

I'it-~;t,

it is alleged that the victim ·was un-

c,}!lc:

to identify appellant on the night of

th(' rnbbe:cy.

The re cm c1 docs not support

14

l ['

I "

r' 0 I IC

s\ir1'.;_i_n'J

J;--rni_

l

l liec're

U ~) j 0 l l •

l

,,

.~

an ample

t-hat the victim did identify appel-

at th2 t
1

limP fru111 phoL-ographs shown

to him by the police

(H.52,72).

It is next contended that the victim
was unilblc to identify appeJlnnt at the
preliminary hearing.

However, a careful

reading of the record discloses that any
difficulty encountered at preliminary hearing by the victim in identifying the men
who robbed him related not to appellant,
but to appellant's

p:coth~r,

irnplical:ec1 in the robbery.

who

wa~::;

pre~>ent

te~;tifiec1

who was also
Officer Barton,

at the preliminary hearing,

at trial that the victim "was

not f>urc" as to identifying _pic:;ha_f_cl Montoya
~t

that hearing

(R.74).

As to whether the

v:i_ct irn bad any difficulty identifying appel) c=1

n L at t ll e pr c J i rn in a 1 y he -:u: in g , 0 f f ice r

J ,-,

l»: l J l rn i

L cs ti Li ul t llz1 t

1-i_m idcnL-ificd liirn

t hrouc:ih coach i

llCJ

( n . 7 4) .

b c c1 i d not

"J_1011t

d

rnnci··~~hot

of L h0 pol ice."

photo

There is

noL hiny in the record to suppoJ:t thi::> claim.
'l'o the cont:rary,

the record cJearly shows

tliat the victim's identification of the
appelJant, both from pliotoc.=itaphs

(R.52,72)

and a line-up (R.52,73), was positive and
without hesitation (R.74),

and was later

cor:coborated by the victim's identification
of appECllant at trial
·
lJ--Y,
F'ina

(R. 74) .

11 an t
appe __

con'ends
that the
'-

line··up in which he was identified by the

victim

~~s

prcjudicjol.

discloses the opposite.
tr~Ljfied
i 1l

Again,

the record

Detective Barton

at trial that the other

p~rsons

l::h e 1 i nE.' ··up 'v\.rc::r e "s imi J <1.r in appear a nee

to i_lH~ ckfcnc1<'1t1L,"

(iz.·74),

<"n1cl "were all of

l (,

_I

(1 I \ [ )

" (' :'>\

'
p_il ex J_on,

II

C (' pt

0 11 C

•

. who is of dark com-

(H,73).

N.Y.2d 958, 286 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1967) and

in support of his argument that the circumstances surrounding the victim's identification of him were "highly suggestive of
a denial of due process."

Both cases are

inupposite to the case at bar.

In Ahmed,

the robbery victim '\'las unable to identify
the defendant from a police photograph on
the night of the robbery.
a}>uvc,

no sucli failure occurred in the in-

s Le-int cci~;e,

where the victim did indeed

Jd' 11tify the app~lJ

ant from photographs,

<:nid later at a line ·-up.
\l

But as discussed

T'c11nesE:'.ec

S irtti 1 ci.1:- l y,

Big~~

involved a factuzil background

c1lli1cly un1iLv

Lhcil

_lli

lli<.:.> case al hand.

s nr«c__ s eve 11 ruon L 11 ::_~ a f: t er a rape liad be en comrnittcd,

and the victim's id0ntification of

sound of the defendant's voice.
tion,

In addi-

the circumstances surrounding the

i dent i f i c a. t i o n in
qu0~~tionable

.~.i CJ g_t:J-:__~

c 1 e a r 1y s u g g e s t e d

police practices.

In contrast,

the jnstant case involved not a one-man
shm1· up seven months u.fter the er ime, but
instr:.:cJ_d a five··man line-up,
pPLsons similar in

composed of

app~arance

to appellant,

conductcJ a mere three days after the robbci:y,

It is thus clecir that the case at

b2( is completely devoid of circu1m3tances
I 1Lc,

tho:-;0 v1hich led to the decision in

J t3

CONCI .1 J ~;JO ti

demonstrate::-~

U1at appclL1nt' s defense was

conc1uctcc1 by a cornpclc.:11t member of the bar
1,.;-110

v.1as v1illiny to and did identify himself

with appellant's intcresb;, and who skillfully presented appellant's defense.

It

is equ2lly evident that the victim's identification of appelJant \vas positive and
without police coaching.
'l'he jud9ment of the trial court should
be affi:r..med.

RespectfulJy submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol

Sa]t Lake City, Utah
l\ l ten

ncy!::~

for Respondent

